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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE W. PRESTON
Plaintiff and
Appellant
vs.
LORNA A. PRESTON
Defendant and
Respondent

*
*
*
*
*
*

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
No.

17597

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce brought by the Plaintiff to
dissolve a marriage entered into between the parties on the 2nd
day of October, 1972.

No children were born of the marriage and

issues on appeal involve the settlement of property between the
parties.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was first heard in the District Court for the First
Judicial District in and for Cache County before the Honorable
Calvin Gould on the 27th day of March, 1980.

Judge Gould entered

a decree of divorce, reserved all matters of property settlement
for trial upon the merits and restrained the Defendant, Lorna A.
Preston, from removing all property acquired during marriage from
the Plaintiff's home.

The trial on the merits was held on the

23rd day of December, 1980 before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist.
Judge Wahlquist awarded to each party the property they held
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prior to marriage including houses, funds and other personal
property and required each party to assume the debts on the
property they received.
The Court without making any finding granted to the
Defendant all property she acquired by inheritance or gift
during marriage.
The trial Court granted to the Defendant a lien in the
amount of $17,000.00 upon a cabin, constructed during marriage
upon land inherited by the Plaintiff prior to marriage without
giving Plaintiff credit for contributions made to the construction from funds he had acquired before marriage.
The Court awarded all personal property to the Defendant
which she had removed from the residence contrary to the order
of Judge Gould, with the exception that Plaintiff was awarded a
silver spoon, dining room furniture,
mother's diamond ring.

tools, his rifle and his

The Court expressly found that the

Defendant was not entitled to either alimony or attorney's fees
and decreed accordingly.

Notwithstanding that finding, however,

the Court awarded the personal property to the Defendant in
"lieu of any further alimony and/or attorney's fees".
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff seeks a modification of the Judgment of the
Trial court as follows:
A.

An award crediting Plaintiff for his contribution to
-2-
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the cabin of $9,310.93 equaling approximately 50% of the construction costs as property owned by the Plaintiff prior to marriage
to be deducted (together with its appreciation) from the market
value of the cabin prior to any division of the equity between
the parties.
B.

For an award to the Plaintiff of 50% interest in the

farm land and cattle acquired by the parties in the name of the
Defendant during the marriage of the parties, the figure of 50%
being the same figure used by the Trial Court in dividing the
equity in the cabin at Bear Lake.

c.

For an award equitably dividing the personal property

of the parties removed from Plaintiff's residence by the
Defendant contrary to and in violation of Judge Gould's Order of
April 4, 1980.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties in this action were married on October 2, 1972
and were divorced on April 4, 1980.

The Plaintiff has been

married on one prior occasion and has 3 children as a result of
that marriage.

The Defendant had been married on two prior

occasions and has three children from the two prior marriages.
The Defendant at the time of the marriage of the parties was not
receiving alimony but was receiving child support from her two
prior husbands.

There were no children born as issue of the

marriage.
The Plaintiff brought into the marriage property as follows:
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real estate located in Rich County, Utah (TR-27) which was
by Plaintiff and his brother as tenants in common;

own~

a residence

in Logan, Utah which was owned jointly with Plaintiff's first
wife, Jane P. Preston, a boat, car, partnership interest in a
law firm, retirement benefits from his employer as a deputy
county attorney and also from his law firm, stocks ana bonds
and a savings account.

This property was awarded to the

Plaintiff.
The Defendant brought into the marriage, a house in Logan,
Utah, savings accounts in the approximate amount of $12,000.00
an automobile and a trust deed and note from her first husband
with a face amount of $65,000.00, part of which had been paid
(TR-28) prior to marriage.

This property was awarded to the

Defendant.
During the course of the marriage the Plaintiff remained
employed and supported the Defendant and her children to the
extent that he paid for all living expenses over and above chiM
support payments, when made, and when they were not made he provided all of the support for the children.

(TR-25)

The

Plaintiff and the Defendant filed a joint income tax return but
any tax due on the Defendant's income was paid from the funds
generated by the Plaintiff.

(TR-33)

During the course of the marriage the Plaintiff was instrumental in collecting for the Defendant the balance due of the
note secured by a trust deed in the amount of $28,000.00 which
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funds were thereafter delivered to the Defendant and invested by
the Defendant, and none of these funds were used by the Plaintiff.
Nevertheless, the Plaintiff's income paid the taxes on the net
income.

At the time of the divorce the Defendant had in excess

of $43,000.00 cash in her name or available to her.

(TR 118-119)

During the course of the marriage each party prepared a
will.

The Defendant's will provided that all property would

pass to her children.

The Plaintiff's will provided, initially

that his property pass to his children.

Following a specific

request by the Defendant, the Defendant was included into the
Plaintiff's Will as a beneficiary. (TR-53)
The Plaintiff and the Defendant acquired various items of
personal property during their marriage which were located in
the residence and at the cabin.

The Defendant, immediately

following the separation, removed all of her property and some
of the Plaintiff's property from the cabin.

An order was

obtained from Judge Gould restraining the Defendant from
removing from the Plaintiff's residence any property acquired by
the parties during their marriage pending a division of the property by the Court.

The Defendant upon leaving the residence,

when ordered by Judge Gould, stripped the house, removed fixtures from the walls, and took all property acquired during the
marriage, down to and including the Plaintiff's hunting rifle,
his mother's ring and a silver heirloom spoon, all telephone
books and the cable t.v. connectors.

(TR 35)

The Defendant
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left furniture owned by the Plaintiff prior to marriage, a
dining room set the Plaintiff had purchased shortly after
marriage with funds he had acquired prior to marriage, and nominal other personal property.

(TR-35)

Judge Wahlquist, who

heard the matter relating to the division of property found that
the acts of the Defendant were in "contemptuous disregard
of the order of Judge Gould.

He ordered the Defendant to return

but 5 items and awarded the Defendant the remaining personal
property in lieu of alimony or attorney's fees.
entry of the District Court)
waived alimony.
Preston".

(TR-111)

(see the minute

The Defendant on two occasions

"I do not want support from Mr.

(TR-138) Q. Okay.

Just so I understand, you are not

asking for alimony in this divorce, is that correct?

A.

That's

correct.
In the year 1975 the Plaintiff commenced construction of a
cabin at Bear Lake upon land owned (TR-27) by Plaintiff and his
brother as tenants in common.

(See Exhibit 7)

of the construction was $18,918.38.

The total cost

$9,310.93 was contributed

by Plaintiff to construction by reason of the sale of assets
owned by the Plaintiff prior to marriage consisting of stocks
and the trailer house that was on the property at the time of
marriage.

The balance of $9,607.45 came from the earnings

generated by the Plaintiff during the three year period of
construction.

The Defendant did not contribute to the

construction of the cabin from her own funds held prior to
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marriage or from the income of said funds or from funds
collected by the Plaintiff for the Defendant during marriage
or the income from the funds.

(TR-30-39)

The Defendant stated

she wanted no part of the Bear Lake property, that she never
asked Plaintiff to put her name on the deed "and, I told him at
the time that I wanted no part of that".

(TR-84)

The Defendant

claims a work contribution in the cabin as it was a family project and that the children of both parties participated in the
construction. (TR-90)

The cabin was valued by the appraisers in

the neighborhood of $34,000.00 and the Trial Court arrived at
that figure as the market value of the cabin.
The Trial Court held by minute entry as follows:

"The

chief property that was acquired during the marriage was the
construction of a home on his property at Bear Lake."
in its findings stated as follows:

The court

"During the marriage acting

as a family, and drawing on their earnings, and daily funds of
all, the family constructed a cabin on the Plaintiff's land."
The Trial Court granted the Defendant a lien of $17,000.00 on
the cabin to be paid by the Plaintiff within 18 months.

The

Trial Court in its findings of fact and its conclusions of law
failed to mention the $9,310.93 contribution made by the
Plaintiff from prior owned funds to the construction and failed
to give the Plaintiff credit for the construction.
The Defendant, following the death of her father in August,
1977, inherited farm land situated immediately west of Logan,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

Utah.

(TR-90)

This land was, during the marriage of the

parties, annexed to the city limits of Logan City.

The

Defendant's mother at the time of the setlement of the estate
deeded additional land to the Defendant and her brother.
(TR-91)

The transfer also included two bulls, 42 cows and

their offspring, Taylor grazing permits and a building lot in
Logan City.

The Plaintiff, an attorney, aided the family in the

administration of the estate, including the preparation of
estate tax returns.

(TR-42)

A substantially reduced fee was

charged for the purpose of offsetting only the expenses of the
law firm as the Plaintiff considered the property an acquisition
by the family.

(TR-42)

The building lot was measured and deeds

prepared by the Plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining deeds
from the Defendant's mother to the Defendant.

(TR-42)

Following the acquisition of the farm land, the Plaintiff help~
with the harvest of the crops, helped feed the cattle and
transport them from summer range.

(TR 43-69)

He helped fence

the east and west boundaries of the property (TR-43) and
Plaintiff would have requested his statutory share of the property had Defendant died during the marriage.

(TR-43)

The Defendant does not deny Plaintiff's participation in
the farm work but comments that "he did come out once in a while
after work.

He was drinking and he caused alot of problems and

great dissension, and finally he was asked not to go back around
the property any more."

(TR-99) The Defendant did not deny
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however Plaintiff's participation in the acquisition of the property through the administration of the estate, his preparation
of deeds for the acquisition of the property from the
Defendant's mother, the fencing and transportation of the
cattle.
The appraiser, Mr. Lynn Balls, stated that the highest and
best use of the property would be for commercial and industrial
purposes.

(TR-20)

His valuation, based upon facts at the time

of the entry of the divorce decree, results in a value to the
Defendant of $161,850.00.
her brother).

(TR-4)

(and a similar value attributed to

December 23, 1980 values were between

$11,000.00 and $20,000.00 per acre with a confirmed sale less
than 4 blocks away of comparable land of $12,000.00 per acre.
(TR-153) yielding a net appraised value of $526,600.00 and a
one-half interest value of $262,800.00 in the name of the
Defendant.

Added to that figure would be the cattle, and the

building lot in the amount of $16,645.00 (Exhibit 6) all of
which was acquired during marriage.
During the marriage the Defendant received substantial
income from the investment of assets acquired during the
marriage as set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit 8.

This income was

retained by the Defendant while the parties maintained themselves on the income earned by the Plaintiff.

The uncontro-

verted facts show the Defendant's earned income of at least
$14,180.00 acquired by her during the marriage was not considered by the Trial Court in arriving at the property

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

distribution, yet the Trial Court concluded that the Plaintiff's
(husband's) wages were "their earnings and daily funds of all".
The Trial Court further found that the PARTIES enhanced
interests in both real and personal properties during marriage,
and from these findings the Trial Court concluded as follows:
Except as hereinafter specifically provided, each of the
parties should be awarded all of the real and/or personal properties they owned or had interest in prior to their marriage,
or that inherited during the marriage.
The Trial Court's division of the property acquired during
marriage resulted in an award to the Plaintiff (husband)
approximately 10% of the total properties acquired during
marriage and a distribution of 90% to the Defendant, wife.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
THE DEFENDANT A ONE-HALF INTEREST IN THE CABIN AT BEAR LAKE.
The Trial Court said in its minute entry that each party
shall have all of the property they had before their marriage.
The Findings of Fact reflect this concept and further find that
during the marriage, the parties enhanced interests in both real
and personal properties.
Exhibit 7 shows the history of the Bear Lake Cabin and
shows that there was a contribution to the construction costs of
the cabin by Plaintiff from prior owned assets of approximately
50% of the construction costs.

The Trial Court ignored not on~
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the content of the exhibit but also the testimony of the
Plaintiff as to this contribution. (TR 38)

Had the Court con-

sidered this fact, the equity would have been only one half of
the net value of the cabin and the Defendant's lien should have
then have been in the amount of $8,500.00 instead of $17,000.00.
This Court as recently as March 2, 1981 in the case of
Georgedes vs. Georgedes, #17073, approved the concept of allocating to each party the property he or she brought into the
marriage.

The Trial Court in the present case for reasons not

found in the Findings of Fact first announced that each shall
have all property they had before marriage then failed to give
the Plaintiff credit for this expenditure.
This is not the first time that this Trial Court has failed
to give a party credit for an expenditure of funds owned prior
to marriage.

In 1974 the Utah Supreme Court decided the case of

Humphreys vs. Humphreys, Utah 520 P2d 193, in which the same
Trial Court that heard the present case directed that the home
of the parties be sold and that the remaining equity, after
payments of debts, should be divided equally between the
parties.

The Trial Judge in Humphreys, as in this case, failed

to give Plaintiff credit for $3,400.00 received from a previously owned home and the Supreme Court speaking through
Justice Crockett said:
" ••••• it is our conclusion that it would be equitable
and just that the Plaintiff's $3,400.00, which was used
as a downpayment to purchase their family home, should
be reimbursed to her, and that it should be a preferred
claim on the proceeds realized from the sale •••• "
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

The facts of the Humphreys case are virtually the same as
in the present case except for the fact that there were children
born to the Humphreys' marriage.

The Supreme Court modified the

decision of the Trial Court in Humphreys to correct the omission
of the Trial Court and similar relief is sought in the present
case.

The Plaintiff now asks this Court to modify the decision

of the Trial Court and to reimburse the Plaintiff for his
contribution to the Cabin from funds owned prior to marriage.
In the case of Jesperson vs. Jesperson, No. 16513 decided
March 20, 1980, 610, P2d, 326, this Court stated the criteria
for the making of an equitable property division.
Court may consider the length of the

mar~iage

The Trial

and the parties'

respective contributions to the marriage.
"It is not unreasonable for the court to permit
the Plaintiff to withdraw from the marital property
the equivalent of those assets Plaintiff brought
into the marriage. All that may be considered to
be marital property acquired through the joint
efforts of the parties was therefore the proceeds
from the sale of the St. George home over and
above its purchase price of $19,027.00".
"Where the marriage is of short duration and
neither party has forgone employment opportunities,
the amount of each parties' contribution to assets
acquired during the .. marriage is a more important
factor in formulating an equitable property
division than it would be after a long-term
marriage where one spouse relinquished employment to case for the family •.•.••..•. while both
parties should share in the increase in value of
marital assets, the general approach in dividing
property after a short term m~rria~e is to_plac7
the parties as nearly as possible in the f1nanc1al
position they would have held if no marriage had
taken place."
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The decision of the Trial Court, as rendered, awards the
Defendant one-half of Plaintiff's contribution in the amount of
$4,655.46, plus the appreciation on that amount through
inflation.

This is clearly an inequitable result taking into

consideration the Trial Court's finding that each party was
awarded the property they held prior to marriage.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
AWARDING THE PLAINTFF A ONE-HALF INTEREST IN AND TO THE FARM
LAND, ANIMALS AND BUILDING LOT ACQUIRED BY THE PARTIES DURING
THEIR MARRIAGE.
The Trial Court in its minute entry said with respect to
the farm land "each party shall have all of the property they
had before the marriage or inherited after marriage".

The Find-

ings of Fact provide that the "Defendant inherited interests in
real and personal properties during the marriage".

The

Conclusions of Law parallel the statements with regards to the
inheritance.

The Supplemental Decree of Divorce grants to the

parties "all real and personal properties they owned or had
interest in prior to their marriage or that inherited during
the marriage.
The Trial Court therefore divided outright the total value
of the cabin located on the Plaintiff's property and totally
ignored, without definitive findings, real and personal property
acquired by the parties during marriage in the name of Lorna A.
Preston
Sponsoredas
by the follows:
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A.

Land valued between $161,850.00 and $262,800.00

B.

Building lot valued at $12,500.00

C.

Cattle valued at $14,270.00

D.

Grazing permits valued at $1,575.00

E.

Income cash derived by Defendant from investments

valued at $14,180.00
The total value of the property awarded to the Defendant by
a stroke of the pen was between $204,375.00 and $305,325.00.
Recent cases seem to support the proposition that a
distinction should not be drawn between property inherited by
a man verses a woman when the issue is the division of property
acquired during marriage.

The Trial Court saw fit to divide

t~

property acquired by the parties during the marriage as it
relates to property in the name of the Plaintiff yet it failed
to divide the property acquired by the parties during the
marriage as it related to that property in the name of the
Defendant.
The Georgedes and Jesperson cases, supra, deal with property brought into the marriage and therefore had no application
to this issue.

The Defendant testified that the value of the

property at the time of her father's death was appraised at

$1,000.00 per acre for the 43.80 acres which accounts for an
inherited value of $43,800.00 and increase in value of the la~
of $118,050.00 and $219,000.00 depending upon the appraisement
figure used.
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The Montana case of Vivian vs. Vivian, 583 P2d 1070, bears
a resemblance to this case.

The husband inherited about

$13,000.00 during the marriage from his mother.

The Trial Court

deducted this amount from the assets of the parties prior to any
division.

The Supreme Court held that the Trial Court erred in

making the decision because the Trial Court had made no specific
findings to support the distribution to the husband.

The

Supreme Court held that inherited property was not per se
excluded and the Court could not properly review the decision of
the lower Court because the findings in the case lack specific
detail, a criticism not uncommon to the present case.
The value of the farm, the animals and the lot in the name
of the Defendant must be considered in the settlement.

McKibban

vs. McKibban, Oregon, 533 P2d 362, found that the wife, about 15
years before the divorce, had received title to a 160 acre farm
in Iowa from her father's estate.

The wife through a verbal

agreement with the family agreed that the farm should stay in
the family.

The Oregon Supreme Court held as follows:

We held that the wife's farm must be considered
as one of the marital assets nothwithstanding
the family agreement.
Colorado has adopted the position that inherited property
is not per se excluded from consideration by a court in marital
property division.

Santilli vs. Santilli, Colo. 453 P2d 606,

where the husband argued that the increase in the value of the
inherited land cannot be considered.

The Court held that the
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increased value is not per se, excluded from consideration by
the Court in making a determination of the property rights of
the parties.

Following the case of Santilli the Colorado

Supreme Court decided the case of Gaski vs. Gaski, 534 P2d 629,
where the Court said as follows:
"Inherited property is not per se excluded from
consideration by a court in marital property
division ••.•• However he must show that by his
efforts conjoined with his wife's he either built
up or kept the family worth intact. He is then
entitled to the value of those efforts in a
property settlement."
"Each case must be decided upon its own merits."
"He performed his legal obligation of supporting
his family for 20 years. This included clothing,
groceries and medical bills. It also included
paying his own federal and state income taxes
and paying the taxes on the ranch income once
with a half-baked recollection of a second time."
The Court in the Gaskie case held that the ranch had not
lost its separate identity as the wife's property, but it must
be remembered that it was inherited 11 years before the
marriage.
The State Supreme Court of Oklahoma has also addressed this
question in the case of Hauser vs. Hauser, Okla, 460 P2d 436.
The

Supreme Court remanded the case saying:
"The enhanced value of separate property resulting
from the parties' joint efforts should be adjudicated
in final settlement of their affairs, time and manner
of acquisition being elements of consideration."
The later Oklahoma case of Kirkland vs. Kirkland, 488 P2d

1222 adds a further dimension to the Hauser case.

There the
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Oklahoma Supreme Court said as follows:
In some of our cases we have treated the increase
in value of the separately owned or acquired
property as being jointly acquired, and have
approved consideration of this enhanced value
in the equitable division of the property •••••
However, in these cases the increased or enhanced
value was considered jointly acquired because
the enhanced value was due to the joint efforts
of the husband and wife.
The Utah Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to rule
on this question to the same extent as other states.

However,

in the case of Dubois vs. Dubois, 504 P2d 1380, this court considered whether or not the husband was entitled to share in the
enhancement of gifts given to the wife by the wife's uncle.
This Court approved the award of 40% of the marital estate to
the husband, and reduced alimony to one dollar per year.

In the

present case the evidence reflects that the Defendant received
substantial property through gifts and inheritance during the
marriage of the parties.

This property was appraised at

$1,000.00 per acre for inheritance tax purposes at the time of
the receipt but was later appraised at values of up to
$12,500.00 per acre.

The Defendant demeans the efforts of the

Plaintiff in the acquisition of the property and the increase in
the value of the property, yet the fact remains that the
Plaintiff secured the acquisition of the property as a family
asset, improved the property and the animals situtated thereon.
Inflation and annexation into the Logan City limits increased
the value of the property to its present status.

The increase
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in value can be attributed to each party.

As with the Bear Lake

Cabin inflation increased the value of the property.

The

Defendant shared in that property as the Plaintiff should share
in the increase in the valuation of the Defendant's land, cattle
and building lot.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

IN

AWARDING

THE DEFENDANT SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY
ACQUIRED BY THE PARTIES DURING THEIR MARRIAGE.
The first judge to enter this case was Judge Gould, who
upon hearing the preliminary matters entered a decree of
divorce, and restrained the Defendant from removing jointly
acquired personal property from the residence that was ultimately restored to the Plaintiff.

Upon separation Plaintiff left

the home he had purchased 16 years earlier with only his shaving
kit (TR-34)

He later returned to take possession of records,

clothes and other items.

Upon the Defendant's removal of many

i terns from the Bear Lake Cabin the Plaintiff sought and received
a restraining order prohibiting the Defendant from removing
items from the home that the parties had jointly acquired.
(TR-145)

The Defendant in knowing disregard of Judge Gould's

order removed substantially all of the jointly acquired proper~
from the home.
(TR-116)

The Defendant says in defense of her actions:

I remember that's what the papers said, but I did not

interpret it that way because I wouldn't have been able to take
clothes,
the children's beds, nothing. Q. Notwithstanding that
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order, you did elect to take certain property out of that home
which is still in your possession.

A.

Yes.

The Trial Court found the Defendant in contemptuous
disregard of Judge Gould's order.

The Plaintiff seeks only to

receive an equitable portion of the personal property in an
orderly manner and not to receive merely that portion left by
the Defendant.

Standing alone this Point as grounds for appeal

may be de minimus and of little consequence, but taken in context with the other Points it reflects the continuing failure
of the Trial Court to provide an equitable distribtuion between
the parties.

This is particularly true in view of the Trial

Court's award of the property to the party in contempt.
CONCLUSION
The decisions of this Court relating to the Appellant's
burden have been printed so often that it is redundant to repeat
them here, except to quote Justice Hall in the case of Mccrary
vs. Mccrary, 599 P2d 1248, stating that a party seeking a reversal of the Trial Court must prove a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, or that the evidence clearly preponderates against
the findings or that such a serious inequity resulted from the
order as to constitute an abuse of the Trial Court's discretion.
Reviewing the facts of this case, in the framework of Justice
Hall's decision, causes the following questions to come to mind:
A.

The Trial court concluded that each party should have
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that property restored to them that they held prior to marriage,
why then did the Trial Court award to the Defendant, one-half of
the Plaintiff's contribution to the cabin from funds held by
him prior to marriage?
B.

The Trial Court concluded that the Bear Lake cabin was

constructed by the parties, "acting as a family and drawing on
their earnings, and daily funds of all,"

why then didn't the

Trial Court seek to divide between the parties the Defendant's
income as it divided Plaintiff's income.
C.

The Trial Court concluded that the Planitiff's income

and cabin was the income and cabin of the parties, should the
Trial Court have also concluded that the Defendant's farm

inco~

and assets were the income and assets of the parties, particularly in view of the fact 'that the Plaintiff supported the
Defendant's children over and above child support and paid the
taxes on all of the Defendant's income.
D.

The Trial Court concluded that the Bear Lake Cabin wu

constructed by the parties, acting as a family and drawing of
their earnings, and daily funds of all, and awarded the
Defendant one-half of the appraised value of the Bear Lake
Cabin, why then didn't the Trial Court conclude that the partiti
had acting as a family and drawing upon their earnings,
increased the value of the farm property, cattle and the
· · d t h ose asse t s in
·
the same fashion as the
building lot and d1v1de
assets in Plaintiff's name were divided.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

E.

The Trial Court concluded that the Defendant was

entitled to neither attorney's fees nor alimony and found the
Defendant in contemptuous disregard of Judge Gould's order, why
then did the Trial Court award the Defendant the very object of
her contempt in lieu of further alimony or attorney's fees.

The

Defendant had on account and available to her the sum of
$43,000.00 in cash at the time of the initial hearing.
The Defendant, in concluding her testimony, was asked by
her attorney what she recommended as being a fair and equitable
settlement.

The Defendant said:

(TRll -221)

"I would like to

keep the property that I owned prior to the marriage and the
property that I inherited and the things that I own, that I
have.

I would like to keep those.

I think that Mr. Preston

should ---- I feel Mr. Preston should keep the property at Bear
Lake; I think the cabin --- we both worked very hard and built,
and I think that that should be divided between us.

Our home on

Thrushwood Drive I would like to get the money back that I put
--- I invested in redecorating it, the $5,000.00.

I think Mr.

Preston should take the money that he had in it prior to our
marriage and then I think the equity between that should be,
minus the mortgage, should be distributed between us.
The concept is not new but time has tarnished it beyond
recognition.
mine.

What is mine is mine and what is yours is one-half

Such dogma has been uttered before but rarely taken

seriously.

The Trial Court awarded to the Defendant more than
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90% of the total property acquired by the parties during
marriage.

In two separate cases this Court considered the per-

centage of distribution between the parties.

The first was the

case of Kerr vs. Kerr filed April 29, 1980, 610 and 1380, where
this Court approved a 55% vs. 45% distribution to the parties
and the second is the case of Dubois vs. Dubois, 504 P2d 1380,
where this Court approved a 60% vs. 40% distribution.
The Trial Court misunderstood and misapplied the law as it
related to the total property acquired by the parties during
their marriage.

The result was substantial and prejudicial

error in denying the Plaintiff credit for his contribution to
the cabin from prior owned funds and denying the Plaintiff a
one-half or equity interest in the farm, building lot and
cattle, together with the accumulation of funds generated by
Defendant during marriage while the parties lived upon the
and resources generated by the Plaintiff.

t~

in~~

The evidence in this

case preponderates against the conclusions of law that the
Defendant should be awarded valuations in excess of $204,000.00
while the Plaintiff should be awarded valuations at $17,000.00
less his contribution of $9,300.93.
be termed an abuse of discretion.

The inequity may reasonably
The net result of Trial

Court's decision is that the Defendant and her children have,
for the past 8 years, been supported by the Plaintiff, Defendant
has reaped the benefit of her acquisitions in property and cash,
in excess of $200,000.00.

She has neither paid income taxes
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from her funds nor has she consumed them for day to day living
expenses.
The Plaintiff does not desire an equal division but the
Plaintiff does desire an equitable division of the property
based upon the sound discretion vested in this Supreme Court.
The abuse of discretion in this case by the Trial Court overshadows the shadings of fact and circumstances known only trier of
fact and involves substantial issues of equality of the parties
before the courts, and the right of the Plaintiff as a litigant
to have his evidence properly considered by the trier of fact.
MrCrary vs. Mccrary, supra.
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